IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 FILED STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel., NEW MEXICO 3 JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION, NOV 1 4 2005 4 Petitioner, 5 vs. NO. 29,239 6 HON. GERALDINE E. RIVERA, Second Judicial RECEIVED District Court Judge, 8 Respondent, STANDARDS COMMISSIO 9 and 10 RANDY M. CHAVEZ, 11 Real Party in Interest. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 13 Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General 14 David K. Thomson, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM 15 16 for Petitioner 17 Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General 18 Arthur W. Pepin, Assistant Attorney General 19 for Respondent 20 Sanchez, Mowrer & Desiderio, P.C. 21 Robert J. Desiderio 22 Albuquerque, NM for Real Party in Interest

DECISION

CHÁVEZ, Justice.

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Under its unusual procedures for obtaining a subpoena, the Judicial Standards **{1}** Commission ("Commission"), upon a concurrence of the majority of the Commissioners, authorized the Executive Director to file a petition in District Court seeking a limited subpoena of a witness. The subpoena commanded the witness, an attorney for the judge in question, to appear for a deposition. The limitation expressly stated on the face of the subpoena was as follows:

> The New Mexico Judicial Standards Commission will be seeking information from you regarding conversations you had with third parties (i.e. individuals who do not have an attorneyclient relationship with you) with respect to a judge's involuntary commitment at a medical facility. The Commission is not seeking from you any information that is protected by an attorney-client relationship and/or the attorney-client privilege.

16 On April 19, 2005, the Commission petitioned the District Court to issue the confidential subpoena and to seal the court file, and the District Court granted the petition on April 19, 2005. In response, the witness filed an emergency motion to quash the subpoena in District Court, asserting two grounds in support of the motion. One, the subpoena sought information protected by the attorney work product doctrine. Two, although the witness was not expected to represent the judge before the Commission, he should be treated as opposing counsel, and courts generally disfavor deposing counsel because testimony from counsel is 23 generally protected by the attorney-client privilege. On April 26, 2005, the District Court

entered an order scheduling an evidentiary hearing for May 23, 2005, and held the subpoena in abeyance until that hearing was to take place. On May 20, 2005, the Commission petitioned this Court for either a writ of prohibition or a writ of superintending control to prohibit the District Court from entering a final order quashing the subpoena and conducting the evidentiary hearing. We entered an order staying the proceedings and heard oral argument on August 17, 2005. We now reverse the District Court and enter a permanent order staying the proceedings. We also remand this matter to the Commission for proceedings consistent with this decision.

WRIT OF PROHIBITION

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The Commission seeks a writ of prohibition or a writ of superintending control.

Article VI, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution grants this Court the power to issue both. Here, we employ the writ of prohibition, which we have defined as:

an extraordinary writ, issued by a superior court to an inferior court to prevent the latter from exceeding its jurisdiction, either by prohibiting it from assuming jurisdiction in a matter over which it has no control, or from going beyond its legitimate powers in a matter of which it has jurisdiction.

State ex rel. Harvey v. Medler, 19 N.M. 252, 258, 142 P. 376, 378 (1914). Although we appreciate the work of the District Court in this case, we find that it has no authority to quash Commission-requested subpoenas or to hold related evidentiary hearings. Therefore, we issue a writ of prohibition and order a permanent stay to end the District Court's

involvement in this case. Further proceedings will take place in the Commission and, if necessary, in this Court.

DISCUSSION

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- Article VI, Section 32 of the New Mexico Constitution was amended in 1967 to {3} create the Commission. This section endows the Commission with the power to investigate and make recommendations to this Court regarding the discipline, removal, or retirement of 7 a judge for, inter alia, willful misconduct or inability to perform a judge's duties. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 32. All papers filed with the Commission and proceedings before the Commission are confidential. Id. The Constitution also empowers the Commission to establish its own procedures for hearings. Id. The role, function and powers of the Commission are reiterated in NMSA 1978, §§ 34-10-1 to 34-10-4 (1968), although the source of the Commission's powers remains the Constitution itself.
- The Commission was designed to be the "watchdog of the judiciary," and "[i]n order 13 to achieve an efficient and well disciplined judicial system possessing the highest degree of integrity, it [was] felt that an independent commission [was] necessary to oversee and 16 investigate performance, conduct and fitness of members of the judiciary." State Judicial Standards Commission v. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, ¶¶ 10-11, 134 N.M. 59, 73 P.3d 197 (quoting 1967 Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission at 88) (quotations removed and emphasis added). Pursuant to its constitutional authority, the Commission has promulgated its own procedural rules and has not adopted the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of New Mexico. See New Mexico Judicial Standards Commission Rules

NMRA 2005 (hereafter "Commission Rules"); cf. Rule 17-301(B) NMRA 2005 (applying the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of New Mexico to attorney disciplinary proceedings). Notably, the Constitution does not grant state district courts jurisdiction over any type of judicial disciplinary matters. Therefore, any jurisdiction that district courts may have must come from the Commission itself.

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Commission Rule 4(B) NMRA 2005 articulates the Commission's subpoena power and provides that a majority of the Commissioners can "petition a district court to subpoena witnesses..., compel their attendance and examine them under oath or affirmation, and...require the production of documents, books, accounts, and other records, and...other discovery." In adopting this rule, it appears that the Commission was influenced by the legislative description of its subpoena power in NMSA 1978, Section 34-10-2(B) (1977), where the Legislature directed the Commission to petition a district court in order to obtain a subpoena. However, the Commission's power to promulgate rules is independent of any legislative power, and the Commission has not authorized district courts to quash Commission-requested subpoenas or to conduct evidentiary hearings regarding them. We note that nothing would prevent the Commission from rewriting its rules to eliminate district courts from the subpoena process, similar to how the Disciplinary Board subpoenas witnesses, see Rules 17-306(A)(3) & (B) NMRA 2005, or to permit an attorney for the Commission to obtain a subpoena consistent with Rule 1-045(A)(3) NMRA 2005, which allows an attorney licenced to practice law in New Mexico and who represents a party to issue a subpoena as an officer of the court.

While the Commission Rules do not establish a procedure for quashing confidential

subpoenas or holding related evidentiary hearings in district court, they outline the procedures for a witness to challenge a Commission subpoena. Commission Rule 18 NMRA 2005 allows a witness to make prehearing motions and authorizes the Chairperson of the Commission to rule upon any prehearing motions, including motions for protective orders like the one sought by the witness in the District Court in this case. If a prehearing motion involves the determination of factual issues, a majority of the Commissioners must approve the decision in order for it to be valid, see Commission Rule 18 NMRA 2005, or the Chairperson can appoint a judicial member of the Commission to preside. See Commission Rule 22(A) NMRA 2005. That presiding member's decision "shall be taken 10 as consented to by the other members, unless one or more calls for a vote, in which latter event such rulings shall be made by a majority of those present." Id.1

If a witness disagrees with a Commission decision and refuses to abide by a 12 13 subpoena, the Commission has two procedural options. One, our Rules Governing Review of Judicial Standards Commission Proceedings allow the Commission to petition this Court for an order requiring the noncompliant witness to show cause why he or she should not be ordered to take the required action. See Rule 27-305 NMRA 2005. If the witness then violates a Supreme Court order to take the action, the witness may be ordered to show cause why he or she should not be held in contempt of Court. Id. Two, in severe cases of misconduct or resistence to Commission proceedings, the Commission can also hold

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¹We note, parenthetically, that while the Chairperson is required to be an appointee by the Governor and as such is always a layperson, see N.M. Const. art. VI, § 32, it has been the practice of the Chairpersons to appoint judicial members of the Commission to decide prehearing motions 23 involving legal issues.

contempt hearings and find people in contempt of the Commission. See Commission Rule 4(E) NMRA 2005. After finding a person in contempt of the Commission, the Commission "shall advise the Supreme Court of its findings, conclusions, and recommendations with respect to the alleged contempt, and the Supreme Court may impose such penalties or sanctions it deems appropriate." Id. Thus, although we are not a fact-finding court, the Constitution requires us to deal with evidentiary issues in these limited situations.²

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Another reason which compels us to reverse the District Court is the important {8} constitutional requirement that Commission proceedings be confidential. In accordance with the independent, watchdog function of the Commission, the Constitution requires Commission proceedings to be confidential until they reach this Court on review, see N.M. Const. art. 6, § 32, and the Commission's rules preserve and seek to effectuate this confidentiality requirement. See Commission Rule 7(A) NMRA 2005 ("All papers and pleadings filed with and proceedings before the commission or its masters shall be confidential. Only when a record is filed by the Commission with the Supreme Court do the proceedings lose their confidential character"). Although we are confident that our district 16 court judges could preserve the confidentiality of Commission proceedings, allowing a district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the facts surrounding a request for a confidential subpoena would interfere with the system our Constitution anticipates.

²The Rules Governing Discipline of lawyers also require this Court to enforce or quash subpoenas. If a witness fails to comply with a subpoena issued by the Disciplinary Board, the disciplinary counsel may apply to the Supreme Court for an order directing the witness to take the 22 requisite action or be held in contempt of court. Rule 17-307 NMRA 2005. A witness may also 23 directly challenge a subpoena issued by the Disciplinary Board by applying to this Court for an order 24 to quash the subpoena. Id.

We overturn the District Court order quashing the confidential subpoena and issue a writ of prohibition to keep the District Court from acting outside of its authority and conducting an evidentiary hearing in this matter. We remand further proceedings to the Commission and direct the Commission to hear the witness's motion to quash the subpoena, along with any other prehearing motions the witness wishes to make. We assume that the Chairperson will adhere to what we understand is the standard practice and will appoint one of the judicial members of the Commission to preside at the hearing on this motion pursuant to Commission Rules 3(B)(1) and 22(A) NMRA 2005. Appointment of a judicial member to consider the motion will allow a professional trained in the law to deal with the legal issues concerning attorney work product and attorney-client privilege. If the Commission upholds the subpoena and the witness still refuses to be deposed, the Commission may then apply to this Court for an order to require the witness to show cause why the witness should not be ordered to take the required action. See Rule 27-305 NMRA 2005.

(10) IT IS SO ORDERED.

EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice

WE CONCUR:

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RICHARD C. BOSSON, Chief Justice

| 1 | -Patrice Informa |
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| 2 | PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice |
| 3 | Petra Jimenez MAES, Justice |

5 PAMELA B. MINZNER, Justice (dissenting)

MINZNER, Justice (dissenting).

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I respectfully dissent. The issue presented is whether the district court was authorized 2 {11} to entertain an emergency motion to quash a subpoena issued by the court at the request of the Judicial Standards Commission. A majority of this Court has concluded that the district court lacked authority to schedule and hold a hearing, primarily because the rules the Commission has adopted governing its proceedings do not authorize the district court either to quash a subpoena requested by the Commission or to hold an evidentiary hearing on whether to do so. Maj. Dec., \P 5. The majority also relies on the provision within the state constitution that Commission proceedings are confidential. Id. \P 8. The majority construes rules the Commission has adopted to provide an alternative forum. Id. \P 6, 7. The arguments that have been made in support of the district court's authority to schedule and hold a hearing, however, seem to me compelling. For the reasons that follow, I believe we should deny the petition.

As the majority notes, the Legislature has authorized the Commission to obtain a subpoena from the district court. See NMSA 1978, § 34-10-2.1(B) (1977). The state constitution recognizes the original jurisdiction of a district court, see N.M. Const. art. VI, § 13, as well as "such jurisdiction of special cases and proceedings as may be conferred by law." Id. The constitution recognizes the original jurisdiction of the district court in the following terms: "original jurisdiction in all matters and causes not excepted in this constitution." Id. I believe the district court had authority to schedule and hold the hearing

in question, because there is no relevant exception within the constitution. I also believe the district court had authority to schedule and hold the hearing in question, because the Legislature has authorized the Commission to obtain a subpoena from the district court. I would infer, if necessary, the court's authority to quash a subpoena it had issued from its power to issue the subpoena. As counsel for Respondent has noted, Rule 1-045 NMRA 2005 5 'expressly authorizes a district court to examine a claim of privilege in the context of 6 compelled disclosure pursuant to a subpoena." Finally, I am not persuaded the Commission 7 rules provide an alternative forum. 8 In petitioning this Court for an extraordinary writ, the Commission has argued that its 9 {13} independence is threatened by district court review of its subpoena pursuant to Rule 1-045.

independence is threatened by district court review of its subpoena pursuant to Rule 1-045. The Commission asks this Court to conclude that "relevance, probative value or other challenge[s]" to its subpoena "must be made through the Commission and reviewed by the Supreme Court." Although its rules do not provide specifically for such a challenge, the Commission has argued that the motion filed in district court should have been presented to the Commission and that this Court might review continued resistance to the subpoena in the context of an order to show cause why the party resisting the subpoena should not be held in contempt.

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Alternatively, the Commission has argued that relief from any court should have been deferred until the Commission had been asked to consider the challenges raised by the emergency motion. The Commission reasons that the doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies applies, and pursuant to that doctrine, the movant should have asked the Commission for a stay. If denied, thereafter, the movant should have sought relief from this Court pursuant to the rules governing judicial review of Judicial Standards Commission Proceedings. See Rules 27-101 to 27-108 NMRA 2005.

In summary, the Commission has asked that this Court conclude that "any challenges to the Commission's investigative authority must be heard within the Commission, with ultimate review by the Supreme Court." The Commission asks us to reach that conclusion through a construction of the rules governing its proceedings and our rules governing review of its proceedings. The majority reaches the conclusion the Commission has asked us to reach, not only by construing those rules to provide an alternative forum, but also by adopting a broad view of the Commission's power to issue rules. Maj. Dec., ¶ 5.

As the Real Party in Interest has noted, however, the Commission rule governing prehearing motions appears to assume a hearing on formal charges has been scheduled. Commission Rule 18 NMRA 2005. The subpoena issued in this case is part of a preliminary investigation, in order to determine whether to hold a hearing. It is not clear that Rule 18 applies to these facts.

In addition, Commission Rule 22 NMRA 2005 appears to govern evidence at a hearing on formal charges, rather than an evidentiary hearing designed to resolve issues involving privilege. Rule 18 does not seem to have been drafted to require the taking of testimony at a pre-trial hearing. In reading Rules 18 and 22 together to permit the chair to

appoint a judicial member to hold such a hearing, the majority seems to be drafting a new rule.

Finally, as the Respondent has noted, the Commission's own rules provide that its jurisdiction "is invoked when notice of formal proceedings is served upon the judge under investigation." Commission Rule 38 NMRA 2005. Rule 38 seems consistent with the provision in the state constitution that the Commission "shall promulgate regulations establishing procedures for hearings under this section." N.M. Const. art. VI, § 32. The rules on which the majority rely appear to be rules designed to govern Commission hearings on formal charges and matters preliminary to those hearings, but following the filing of formal charges.

For these reasons, I have not been persuaded that the Commission has provided an alternative forum for the issues the emergency motion raises, and thus, that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies. I also am not persuaded that the Commission has the power to rewrite its rules "to eliminate district courts from the subpoena process." Maj. Dec., ¶ 5. I am not persuaded that power is consistent with the authority granted the Commission by the state constitution to establish "procedures for hearings under this section." N.M. Const. art. VI, § 32.

Perhaps, in the end, the decision of the majority will be perceived as an exercise of this Court's authority under the state constitution to issue writs "necessary or proper for the complete exercise" of our jurisdiction or our authority to exercise "superintending control

over all inferior courts." N.M. Const. art. VI, § 3. Perhaps, in resolving the issues raised by the Commission, the Respondent, and the Real Party in Interest, we are helping draft rules governing procedures of the Commission before formal charges are filed, much as we have drafted or approved rules governing our review of proceedings following the disposition of formal charges and as we have drafted or approved rules governing proceedings of the 5 Disciplinary Board. In that event, the process of drafting might have been improved had we allowed the district court to entertain the emergency motion, resolve the issues presented, and provide us a record of the evidentiary hearing. We then would have had an opportunity to evaluate legal arguments in the context of a more specific ruling. The procedures that govern extraordinary writs give the parties a very short time in which to frame and support their arguments and give us an even narrower view of a problem than we have in the course of more traditional appellate review. An extraordinary writ is a much less awkward procedure when the relevant legal principles are clear and the facts are undisputed.

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In this proceeding, after briefing and oral argument, I am left with the sense that the {21} arguments in support of the district court's authority to entertain the emergency motion are The majority decision concedes that the district court could preserve compelling. confidentiality in the course of entertaining the emergency motion. Maj. Dec., \P 8. Thus, I think the premise on which the majority decision depends is that the Commission rules are the sole source for resolution of the issues presented by the extraordinary writ. I believe that this premise requires us to read more into the Commission rules than the words permit and

| 1 | to read less within other relevant texts than we ought to do. | |
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| 2 | [22] I believe that under existing law, we should deny the petition. My colleagues being | 3 |
| 3 | of a different view, I respectfully dissent. | |
| 4 5 | Panula B. Minzner, Justice | |
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